1		Honorable Barbara Mack Noted for Hearing: June 1, 2016
2		Without Oral Argument
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9	SUPERIOR COURT OF WASHIN	IGTON FOR KING COUNTY
10	MARIA LUISA JOHNSON, CARMELIA	
11	DAVIS-RAINES, CHERYL MUSKELLY, PAULINE ROBINSON, ELAINE SEAY-	NO. 15-2-03013-2 SEA
12	DAVIS, TONI WILLIAMSON, and LYNDA	
13	JONES,	DEFENDANT SEATTLE PUBLIC UTILITIES' OPPOSITION TO
14	Plaintiffs,	PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO COMPEL TESTIMONY OF
15	v.	ROGER FAUSTINO
16	SEATTLE PUBLIC UTILITIES, a department of the CITY OF SEATTLE, a municipality,	
17		TRIAL DATE: July 11, 2016
18	Defendant.	
19		
20		DUCTION
21	Plaintiffs' counsel deposed SPU employe	e Rogerich "Roger" Faustino on May 5,
22	2016, and closed the deposition when he finished	his questioning. Two hours later, he asked
23	SPU if he could conduct a follow-up deposition re	egarding photographs that he had subpoenaed
24	from Mr. Faustino, which had been timely produc	
25	Plaintiffs' counsel had trouble accessing. SPU noted that counsel had already closed Mr.	
26	Faustino's deposition, but, in the spirit of coopera	tion, agreed to an additional deposition on the
27	condition that all questions be limited to the photo	os produced on the thumb drive. Although

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Plaintiffs' counsel appeared to agree to limit his questions to the documents produced pursuant to his subpoena, at Ms. Faustino's second deposition he immediately tried to question him on a new and unrelated area – that he supposedly "lied" during his first deposition about making racially inappropriate comments. It is undisputed that Mr. Faustino played no role whatsoever in any of the disciplinary decisions regarding the plaintiffs in this case. And, four days *after* the first Faustino deposition, Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their claims for hostile work environment. So, even assuming that it is true that Mr. Faustino lied about making racially inappropriate comments – which it is not -- the information Plaintiffs seek to obtain from a third Faustino deposition is completely irrelevant to their stated claims against SPU. Now, instead of taking time to prepare its case for trial, SPU is forced to respond to Plaintiffs' meritless discovery positions even though discovery closed on May 23. The Court should deny Plaintiffs' motion so the parties can turn their attention to the significant task at hand: preparing for the upcoming July 11 trial.

II. STATEMENT OF FACTS

On April 26, 2016, Plaintiffs' counsel issued a subpoena duces tecum commanding Mr. Faustino to appear for a deposition on May 5, 2016. Faustino Declaration ("Faustino Decl.") at ¶ 1; Simpson Declaration ("Simpson Decl."), Ex. A at 1. That subpoena also commanded him to bring to the deposition various categories of documents. Simpson Decl., Ex. A at 2. Mr. Faustino had no involvement in either the workplace investigations or disciplinary proceedings upon which Plaintiffs' claims in this lawsuit are based. Simpson Decl., Ex. B at 29:6-18. Plaintiffs have never alleged otherwise. *See* Docket No. 149 at ¶¶ 1.1–5.1 (Plaintiffs' Third Amended Complaint for Damages, Injunctive and Declaratory Relief or "Third Amended Complaint").

Mr. Faustino duly attended his deposition on May 5, 2016, bringing with him a thumb drive that contained various responsive photographs and videos. Simpson Decl., Ex. B at 1; 9:7-22. Plaintiffs' counsel was unable to access the files on Mr. Faustino's thumb drive for unknown technical reasons, so SPU's counsel agreed to make copies of the photographs and

DEFENDANT'S OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO COMPEL TESTIMONY - 2 DWT 29665013v4 0002348-000028 videos it contained and provide them to Plaintiffs' counsel after the deposition. Simpson Decl., Ex. B at 24:4-14.

During the deposition, Mr. Faustino was questioned at length about comments that he had made on Facebook and other social media accounts that Plaintiffs' counsel suggested were racially discriminatory. Plaintiffs' counsel also repeatedly asked Mr. Faustino if he had made a recording of some of the plaintiffs in the workplace calling them racially derogatory terms. Mr. Faustino repeatedly denied doing so.¹ After questioning Mr. Faustino at length, Plaintiffs' counsel closed the deposition at 3:15 p.m. Simpson Decl., Ex. B at 28:19; 29:17-18. At 5:37 p.m. that same day –only two hours after Mr. Faustino's deposition and before he had a chance to review what was on the thumb drive – Plaintiff's' counsel emailed SPU's counsel, ostensibly seeking to depose Mr. Faustino about the files on the thumb drive (although he had yet to receive or review them): "Portia . . . Could you send along Mr. Faustino's documents as soon as possible? I'll want to depose him again briefly once I have them." Simpson Decl., Ex. C at 1.

On May 6, SPU's counsel responded to Plaintiffs' counsel's email, explaining that although SPU had no obligation to produce Mr. Faustino for deposition a second time since the prior deposition was closed, SPU would do so as a good faith gesture:

> You finished Faustino's deposition. That was your choice. I will not let you open it up again to go over ground that you either forgot or chose not to do so. In an attempt to work with you, I am agreeing to allow you to question him about the documents that were on the flash drive that he *timely* produced, pursuant to you[r] [subpoena duces tecum] – although I have no obligation to do so. If we cannot agree to these parameters, please let me know. I will withdraw my agreement to produce him for a second time.

Simpson Decl., Ex. D at 1 (emphasis in original).²

¹ Every single one of the plaintiffs testified at their depositions that they "*heard*" that Mr. Faustino had made a video that was posted on You Tube where he referred to a number of plaintiffs as "coons." Every single one of the plaintiffs admitted however that they had never seen such a video; that Mr. Faustino had never admitted making such a video; and that they had never heard Mr. Faustino say anything that they considered racially derogatory to persons of color. *See*, Simpson Decl. at ¶ 8.

² Plaintiffs' motion conspicuously omits from its factual summary SPU's counsel's email responses to Plaintiffs' counsel.

1	Plaintiffs' counsel's response ten minutes later indicated assent to these parameters, and	
2	certainly did not express any disagreement:	
3 4 5	You are honorable, and a good lawyer. I'm going to trust that you will evaluate each question at the time it is asked to decide if you will object. I don't think you will – although of course I can't share my strategy with you. I will certainly ask the witness about the documents produced on the thumb drive.	
6	Simpson Decl., Ex. D at 1.	
7	On May 9, 2016, (just four days after Mr. Faustino's deposition) Plaintiffs filed their	
8	Third Amended Complaint, which dropped their disparate impact and harassment/hostile work	
9	environment claims against SPU. Compare Docket 146 at ¶¶ 3.2, 3.3 3 with Docket 149 at	
10	\P 3.2. Significantly, there is not a single allegation regarding Mr. Faustino or any of his	
11	alleged conduct anywhere within this 25-page complaint. See Docket 149 at ¶¶ 1.1-5.1.	
12	On May 11, 2016, SPU's counsel reiterated that it was agreeing to produce Mr.	
13	Faustino a second time as a courtesy, but only to address the documents Mr. Faustino brought	
14	to the May 5 deposition:	
15 16 17	Faustino can be available for deposition on the limited questions of the documents included on the flash drive that he timely produced pursuant to your subpoena on the afternoon of May 18 th . I assume that the deposition will take no longer than 45 minutes. Please confirm.	
18	Simpson Decl., Ex. E at 1. Plaintiffs' counsel tersely indicated assent (or sought to give that	
19	impression): "How about 4:00?" ⁴ Simpson Decl., Ex. E at 1.	
20	Pursuant to this understanding, SPU's counsel produced Mr. Faustino for a second	
21	deposition on May 18, 2016. Simpson Decl., Ex. F at 1. At the outset of the deposition, SPU's	
22	counsel again emphasized the deposition's limited scope:	
23 24	The last round of Mr. Faustino's deposition occurred on May5, 2016. That deposition was closed at the end. Our office has communicated with Mr. Sheridan for purposes of allowing a	
25 26 27	 ³ Docket 146 is Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint for Damages, Injunctive and Declaratory Relief. ⁴ Plaintiffs' counsel's complete omission of this response from Plaintiffs' motion is particularly notable, as it is the clearest indication of his assent to the limited scope of the second deposition. 	

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second round of the deposition to go forward for the *express and limited purpose of discussing documents that [Mr. Faustino] brought with him on a thumb drive* pursuant to a previously issued subpoena.

Simpson Decl., Ex. F at 4:17-23 (emphasis added).

Plaintiffs' counsel did not indicate he had a different understanding of the deposition's scope, stating only "So I – I think we can address whether it was actually closed at a later time, but I welcome your making the record." Simpson Decl., Ex. F at 4:24-25.

After questioning Mr. Faustino for several minutes about innocuous photographs from his thumb drive, Plaintiffs' counsel began asking questions obviously outside of the agreed-to scope: "*After the last deposition, after you walked out, did you talk to Toni Williamson?*" Simpson Decl., Ex. F at 11:17-18. SPU's counsel instructed Mr. Faustino to not answer the question and once again informed Plaintiffs' counsel "[W]e brought him here with the sole understanding that we're limiting it to things on the [memory] stick, and that's what we're sticking to" and "Jack, you brought us here under false pretenses . . . We told you that the deposition is limited." Simpson Decl., Ex. F at 11:1-12:3; 12:6-13:10.

After SPU's counsel informed Plaintiffs' counsel he would continue to instruct Mr. Faustino not to answer questions outside the agreed-to scope of the deposition, Plaintiffs' counsel attempted to end the deposition. Simpson Decl., Ex. F at 13:22-25. SPU's counsel informed Plaintiffs' counsel that he would enter as exhibits emails in which Plaintiffs' counsel had agreed to limit the scope of the deposition, and Plaintiffs' counsel then exited the room with his clients as SPU's counsel 'did so. Simpson Decl., Ex. F at 13:22-15:25. SPU's counsel then closed the deposition in Plaintiffs' counsel's absence. Simpson Decl., Ex. F at 15:16-16.

According to the "Declaration of Toni Williamson", which was executed hours after the first day of Mr. Faustino's deposition, Plaintiff Williamson confronted Mr. Faustino after the deposition and accused him of lying. Sheridan Declaration, Ex. 3 at Ex. 9. According to Plaintiff Williamson, Mr. Faustino responded "I'm sorry. I'm scared." Sheridan Declaration, Ex. 3 at Ex. 9.

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Plaintiff's' counsel now argues that Mr. Faustino thus "admitted . . . that he had just lied." Plaintiff's' Motion to Compel Testimony of Roger Faustino at 1:2-3. Mr. Faustino, however, did no such thing. To the contrary, he has submitted a sworn statement that he did not lie at his deposition. Instead, he apologized to Plaintiff Williamson only because he felt that Plaintiffs' counsel had wrongfully accused him of being a racist in front of Plaintiffs, who are his current and former work colleagues. Faustino Decl. at ¶¶ 2-5.

III. EVIDENCE RELIED UPON

SPU relies on the pleadings and evidence in the Court's file for this matter, the Declaration of Arthur Simpson, and the Declaration of Rogerich Faustino.

IV. ARGUMENT

A. Plaintiffs' Motion Should be Denied Because of Plaintiffs' Counsel's Bad Faith Conduct.

"[T]he spirit of the [discovery] rules is violated when advocates attempt to use discovery tools as tactical weapons rather than to expose the facts and illuminate the issues by overuse of discovery or unnecessary use of defensive weapons or evasive responses." *Washington State Physicians Ins. Exch. & Ass'n v. Fisons Corp.*, 122 Wn.2d 299, 341, 858 P.2d 1054 (1993) (citations and quotations omitted). "[A] spirit of cooperation and forthrightness during the discovery process is necessary for the proper functioning of modern trials." *Id.*

SPU made every effort to accommodate Plaintiffs' counsel, helping him retrieve documents from Mr. Faustino's thumb drive and then agreeing to produce Mr. Faustino for a second deposition without the issuance of a second subpoena or a court order to question Mr. Faustino about those documents, which – again – it had no obligation to do. For his part, Plaintiffs' counsel originally *appeared* to agree to limit the scope of the second Faustino deposition to the contents of Mr. Faustino's thumb drive. Despite his apparent assent, Plaintiffs' counsel tried to blindside SPU's counsel at the May 18 deposition using his client's declaration. The timing of Plaintiffs' counsel's request for a second deposition of Mr. Faustino within three hours after he concluded his deposition, *before* he knew what was on the thumb
drive, but *after* he had spoken to his client – certainly suggests subterfuge.

If Plaintiff's' counsel wanted to depose Mr. Faustino about Plaintiff Williamson's declaration or events occurring after the May 5 deposition, he could have and should have either informed SPU's counsel of the same or issued a second subpoena for a second deposition. That way, the parties could have resolved the propriety of a second deposition and its scope weeks ago. Instead, Plaintiffs' counsel chose to sandbag SPU. The Court should not reward such behavior by permitting Plaintiffs' counsel to conduct a *third* deposition of Mr. Faustino after discovery has closed.

В.

Plaintiffs' Motion Should be Denied Because the Testimony Sought is Irrelevant.

Notwithstanding Plaintiffs' counsel's questionable discovery practices, Plaintiffs' motion should be denied because the testimony Plaintiffs seek from Mr. Faustino is *completely irrelevant* to their claims of disparate treatment⁵ and retaliation.⁶

"A discovery request must be relevant to the subject matter of the suit. A discovery request must be reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence." *Neighborhood All. of Spokane Cty. v. Cty. of Spokane*, 172 Wn.2d 702, 747, 261 P.3d 119 (2011) (citing CR 26(b)(1)). "Relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." ER 401.

Plaintiffs' Third Amended Complaint, which was filed only four days after the May 5 deposition of Mr. Faustino, does not contain a single allegation against him. Nor could

⁵ "The plaintiff's ultimate burden at trial in a disparate treatment lawsuit is to present evidence sufficient for a reasonable trier of fact to conclude that *the defendant's alleged discriminatory motive was more likely than not a substantial factor in its adverse employment action.*" *Fulton v. State, Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs.*, 169 Wn. App. 137, 149, 279 P.3d 500 (2012) (emphasis added).

⁶ To establish a prima facie retaliation case, a plaintiff must show that (1) he engaged in statutorily protected activity, (2) *his employer took an adverse employment action against him*, and (3) there is a causal link between the activity and the adverse action. *Alonso v. Qwest Commc'ns Co., LLC*, 178 Wn. App. 734, 753-54, 315 P.3d 610 (2013).

Plaintiffs have so alleged in good faith, as Mr. Faustino had nothing to do with the disciplinary actions underpinning Plaintiffs' claims against SPU. The only conceivable claim Plaintiffs' could bring based upon the conduct of a supervisor such as Mr. Faustino who played no role in any specific disciplinary action is a claim for hostile work environment.⁷ Yet Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their hostile work environment causes of action *four days after* deposing Mr. Faustino. Plaintiffs' merely seek to bog the litigation down with an irrelevant sideshow in violation of the Civil Rules. The Court should not permit them to do so, and it should deny their motion.

V. **CONCLUSION**

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant SPU respectfully requests that the Court deny Plaintiffs' motion to compel.

DATED this 27th day of May, 2016.

Davis Wright Tremaine LLP Attorneys for Defendant Seattle Public Utilities

By /s/ Arthur Simpson Portia R. Moore, WSBA #13354 Arthur A. Simpson, WSBA #44479 1201 Third Avenue, Suite 2200 Seattle, WA 98101-3045 Tel: (206) 757-8089 Fax: (206) 757-7089 Email: portiamoore@dwt.com

 7 To establish a prima facie case for a hostile work environment claim based on race, the plaintiff-employee must show (1) the harassment was unwelcome, (2) the harassment was because of race, (3) the harassment affected the terms or conditions of employment, and (4) the harassment is imputed to the employer. Washington v. Boeing Co., 105 Wn. App. 1, 12-13, 19 P.3d 1041 (2000).

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1	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE	
2		
3	I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the document to which this	
4	certificate is attached to be served in the manner as indicated below:	
5 6	John P. Sheridan, WSBA #21473□Via Legal MessengerAttorney for Plaintiffs□U.S. Mail, postage prepaidThe Sheridan Law Firm, P.S.□Federal Express	
7	705 Second Avenue, Suite 1200 □ Facsimile Seattle WA 98104 □ Facsimile	
8 9	Solution, WAT 2010 T \boxtimes E-Serve ApplicationTel: (206) 381-5949 \square EmailFax: (206) 447-9206 \square EmailEmail: jack@sheridanlawfirm.com \square Email	
10		
11	Declared under penalty of perjury under the laws of the state of Washington dated at	
12	Seattle, Washington this 27th day of May, 2016.	
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14	<u>/s/ Lynn Nydam</u> Lynn Nydam	
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