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The Honorable Kenneth Schubert
Noted for Hearing: July 8, 2016
Time: 10:30 a.m.
Trial Date: September 12, 2016

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
KING COUNTY

TONI GAMBLE,

Plaintiff,

vs.
CITY OF SEATTLE, a municipal
corporation,

Defendant.

Case No.: 15-2-10231-1 SEA

**PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE IN
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT**

PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

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I. INTRODUCTION

In employment discrimination cases, the Washington Supreme Court has set a high bar to grant a summary judgment motion, writing that summary judgment is “seldom appropriate” and “should rarely be granted.”¹ This is not that rare case. As with any motion under CR 56, the Court “must consider the material facts and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmovant party,” in this case in Plaintiff’s favor. Additionally, in cases alleging discrimination “the court must review the record ‘taken as a whole,’”² and “[a]ll of the evidence - whether direct or indirect - is to be considered cumulatively.”³

Defendant’s motion is a one-sided presentation of evidence that focuses on many irrelevant points, while omitting discussion of several key facts. For example, despite recognizing that Plaintiff claims retaliation, Defendant offers no information about the facts or timing of Plaintiff’s protected activities, nor does it acknowledge the adverse facts that it uncovered through its own investigation of Plaintiff’s complaints. On the record cited herein, a jury may find Plaintiff was denied promotions to jobs for which she was well-qualified and otherwise treated adversely, creating an abusive working environment; and that a substantial factor for these actions was her disability, age, gender, and/or protected activities.

For purposes of Plaintiff’s claims for disparate treatment and hostile work environment based on “disability,” as defined by RCW 49.60.040(7)(a), it cannot be disputed Toni Gamble has a “record or history” of disability. Gamble suffers from a Category 3 permanent partial disability in the lumbar area.⁴ Seattle City Light’s attendance records for Ms. Gamble from 2010-2011 reflect that “a good portion of her absences were coded as either L&I Leave or unpaid FML. Ms. Gamble was out, either full time or half time, on L&I or FML from March 2,

¹ Scrivener v. Clark College, 181 Wn.2d 439, 445, 334 P.3d 541 (2014), quoting Sangster v. Albertson’s, Inc., 99 Wn. App. 156, 160, 991 P.2d 674 (2000).

² Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000).

³ Raad v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough Sch. Dist., 323 F.3d 1185, 1194 (9th Cir. 2003).

⁴ Tort Claim, at 5 (Manville Dec., Ex. A, at Ex. 16, p. 5).

1 2010 - July 29, 2011.” Ex. 9 at 12. In May 2012, Customer Care Director Kelly Enright
2 responded to an email from Plaintiff’s new manager David Wernli, who referred to Ms.
3 Gamble’s doctor as “a quack” and questioned the validity of Gamble’s sick leave. Enright
4 responded, “This is **why I was worried before** regarding attendance.” Sheridan Dec., Ex. 1.
5 Earlier that month, Enright and Wernli were the decision-makers who decided to select an
6 inexperienced 31-year-old male job applicant over Ms. Gamble, who is 51 years old and had
7 already performed in the vacant job successfully.

8 A few months later, after Wernli hired a new manager (Jon Trout) to supervise
9 Gamble’s work unit, he immediately began tracking Gamble’s attendance. Trout also denied
10 Gamble the ability to telecommute, an accommodation Plaintiff’s prior manager, Bryan
11 Leuschen, permitted and which Trout allowed others to do on projects similar to those for
12 which he denied Gamble the work from home. When Plaintiff took sick leave as the result of
13 FMLA-covered impairments, Trout tersely objected to the “consistency of [her] work
14 schedule,” causing Gamble to respond to the newly hired manager that he “should become
15 familiar with our Sick Leave Policy before making these accusations[:]; I am under the care of
16 my physician for my illness and I will be contacting our HR Department regarding your
17 treatment and accusations.”⁵ Not long after that, Gamble wrote the Division Director (Enright)
18 about “issues with [the] new manager,” asking “Do they just not like women?” Sheridan Dec.,
19 Ex. 24.⁶ Enright did not report Gamble’s allegations to H.R., nor did she meet with Gamble
20 about the complaint.

21 Defendant claims that “Gamble has no direct evidence that City Light discriminated”
22 against her,⁷ yet it is undisputed that Trout violated company policies by making “derogatory
23

24 _____
⁵ Sheridan Dec., Ex. 2.

⁶ All Exhibits reference the attachments to the Declaration of John P. Sheridan, unless stated otherwise.

⁷ Def.’s Mot. at 15. “‘Direct ... evidence’ includes discriminatory statements by a decision maker. Fulton v. State
Dept of Soc. & Health Servs., 169 Wn. App. 137, 164, 279 P.3d 500 (2012).

1 comments in front of his supervisors” about Plaintiff. Sheridan Dec., Ex. 3. Trout said that
2 Gamble has “a perpetual excuse for not coming in to work” and “keeps sending in doctor’s
3 notes that she needs to stay home.” Sheridan Dec., Ex. 4. After Plaintiff made a formal
4 complaint of discrimination to H.R. regarding the new manager’s treatment, there was an
5 investigation that led to Trout being counseled to “exercise good judgment as a manager in his
6 communication with staff concerning protected activity” and to “not make comments that
7 could appear to discourage his staff from accessing or taking FML leave.” *Id.* Gamble’s use of
8 leave was not just protected activity—to the extent it is the result of a disability, the law
9 considers it “*part of the disability*” and not a separate basis for adverse action. *See, e.g., Riehl*
10 *v. Foodmaker, Inc.*, 152 Wn.2d 138, 152, 94 P.3d 930 (2004) (en banc).

11 Nevertheless, in February 2013, the new manger (Trout), with the review and approval
12 of his superiors (Manager of Customer Engineering David Wernli and Division Director Kelly
13 Enright) gave Plaintiff an unfair and overly critical performance evaluation, stating “Toni’s
14 reliability and productivity is hindered by extraordinarily large number of hours she is not at
15 work. Based on the review of historical attendance records, over the past three years Toni has
16 been absent from work a total of 3,682 hours, that’s 59% of a normal full time work schedule
17 of 6,420.” This was a criticism both on Gamble’s use of authorized vacation and her authorized
18 absences resulting from a disability. Plaintiff’s manager for many years, Bryan Leuschen
19 testifies that “Toni never took unauthorized time off” and he “never felt that she wasn’t pulling
20 her weight. Toni did exactly what we wanted her to do.” Sheridan Dec., Ex. 5 at ¶ 13.

21 After Gamble objected to H.R. about her non-selection for an out-of-class assignment
22 to ESE; reported unfair accusations from Trout about her use of sick leave; and wrote the
23 Division Director asking whether the two new mangers (Wernli and Trout) “just [do] not like
24 women,” Gamble received a *de facto* demotion, assigning her to do the work of a Senior ESR,
25 rather than the Supervising ESR job she had been promoted to seven years earlier. Gamble was

1 then also given an unfairly critical performance evaluation, which chastised her for her
2 attendance record from the prior three years, without acknowledging that all of her leave was
3 authorized and much of it was protected leave resulting from a disability. Since that time,
4 Gamble has applied for a substantial number of jobs at City Light and experienced a pattern of
5 rejection that was not present in her career before 2012, when Enright hired Wernli and Trout.

6 For such reasons and those that follow, the jury can reasonably find that Plaintiff was
7 subjected to disparate treatment and a hostile work environment, where a “substantial factor”
8 for Defendant’s treatment of Plaintiff was her gender, age, record or history of a disability,
9 and/or her protected activities, and that she was therefore subjected to unlawful retaliation. The
10 Court should heed rule that summary judgment is “seldom appropriate” in these cases and deny
11 Defendant’s motion.

12 II. STATEMENT OF FACTS

13 A. The Customer Care division at Seattle City Light

14 Since 2007, Kelly Enright has been the Director of the Customer Care Branch at Seattle
15 City Light. Sheridan Dec., Ex. 6 at 6:5-9. Enright reported to Phil West, who was a direct
16 report to the Superintendent, Jorge Carrasco. *Id.*, at 10:2-13. Enright’s branch provides “cradle
17 to grave customer service,” including “customer service engineering, meter reading, technical
18 metering, business process improvement, all of the customer account services including
19 collections.” *Id.*, at 6:17-20. Director Enright has numerous direct reports including managers
20 over technical metering, meter reading and office services, account services, the business
21 process improvement team, the electric service engineering group, the north service center and
22 the south service center, the advanced metering program, and the mobile work force project.
23 *Id.*, at 18:4-17. Enright has hiring authority for her division and must “sign off on every bit of
24 paperwork that comes through for any hires that happen.” *Id.*, at 12:19-13:5.

1 From 1990, until he retired in 2012, Bryan Leuschen was the Manager over Customer
2 Engineering at the South Service Center, supervising Electrical Service Representatives
3 (“ESR”) and reporting to Enright for most of that time. Sheridan Dec., Ex. 5 at ¶¶ 2-3, 7;
4 Sheridan Dec., Ex. 6 at 47:5-8, 14:4-17. “Customer Engineering provides assistance to
5 contractors, developers, and property owners with the installation of new or rewired electrical
6 services.” Sheridan Dec., Ex. 5 at ¶ 2. Leuschen states, “In a typical account, we would do an
7 initial intake, give electrical design advice and regulation advice to the customer as to the
8 process, inspect the customer’s installation prior to having our crews come out, and coordinate
9 with the crews and others, including the billing department.” *Id.* Leuschen started with Seattle
10 City Light as a Meter Reader; then became an ESR; Senior ESR; Supervising ESR (1980-
11 1990); and finally a manager (1990-2012). He “never felt that not having a degree hurt [his]
12 career.” Sheridan Dec., Ex. 5 at ¶ 7.

13 **B. Toni Gamble worked for Seattle City Light for over 25 years, gaining a wealth of**
14 **knowledge, training, and experience as she was promoted through the ranks.**

15 Plaintiff Toni Gamble is an experienced supervisor with a strong technical background,
16 who from 1987 to 2012 had a record at Seattle City Light (“SCL”) of advancing into more
17 challenging roles and succeeding in “out-of-class” (“OOC”) assignments. Gamble began her
18 career at Seattle City Light (“SCL”) in October 1987 as a utility construction lead worker.
19 Gamble Dec., ¶ 1. In June 1996, after many years of obtaining experience at SCL and several
20 promotions, including assignments as a Power Structures Mechanic and Electrician-
21 Constructor Apprentice, Gamble became an Electrical Service Representative (“ESR”). She
22 was promoted to Senior ESR in 1999, and was promoted by Bryan Leuschen to **Supervising**
23 **ESR** in 2006.⁸ From such time through 2012, she worked primarily in that job and in other
24 roles as out-of-class (“OOC”) assignments, including a stint as North Customer Electrical

25 ⁸ The promotion to Supervising ESR was an out-of-class assignment in 2006. Gamble was hired permanently for the position in 2007, with no gap in service. See Sheridan Dec., Ex. 8 Sheridan Dec., Ex. 5 at ¶8.

1 Services Manager 2,⁹ receiving positive performance reviews throughout. Gamble Dec., ¶ 5,
2 Sheridan Dec., Ex. 8.

3 Leuschen testifies that Gamble “did her job fine” and was a “hard worker” to whom he
4 gave positive performance evaluations and permitted to stand in for him when he was gone,
5 reflecting “my trust in Toni.” Sheridan Dec., Ex. 5 at ¶¶ 8, 15-17, Exs. 1-3. “City Light admits
6 that up until 2012, Gamble received generally positive annual written performance evaluations,
7 including, in general, ratings that she met or exceeded expectations.” Sub# 14, Def.’s Answer,
8 ¶ 2.24.;

9 **C. In 2012, two new managers were hired: David Wernli and Jon Trout.**

10 On March 28, 2012, David Wernli was hired as Manager of Customer Engineering.
11 Sheridan Dec. Ex. 9 at 2. Wernli then alerted his old friend, Jon Trout, about an opening for the
12 Customer Electric Service Manager position under him. Sheridan Dec., Ex. 10 at 51:22-55:1.
13 Gamble applied for the job, attempting to follow Bryan Leuschen’s career path, but Wernli
14 hired Trout. *See* Sheridan Dec., Ex. 11 at 26:8-9; Sheridan Dec., Ex. 12; Sheridan Dec., Ex. 5
15 at ¶ 3. Wernli and Trout were both from outside of SCL and the public sector; neither had any
16 knowledge or experience in power generation. Sheridan Dec., Ex. 11 at 6:23-7:19; Sheridan
17 Dec., Ex. 5 at ¶ 9; Sheridan Dec., Ex. 13. Trout had not had a job supervising anyone for the
18 prior seven years, as the sole employee of Trout LLC / Cheers Connection, a “specialty beer &
19 wine marketer and event facilitator,” who “sold wine on the Internet,” organized wine-tasting
20 events, and supplemented his income by consulting on “website design and ... customer
21 experience.”¹⁰ Sheridan Dec., Ex. 13; Sheridan Dec., Ex. 10 at 43:14-46:14. Trout also had a
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23 _____
24 ⁹ “[M]anager 2... is the position that Mr. Trout held.” Sheridan Dec., Ex. 6 at 61:9-10.

25 ¹⁰ On his application to SCL, Trout claimed he was employed running his own business for seven years, through
“present,” the time he was applying. Sheridan Dec., Ex. 17. However, in his deposition Trout admitted that his
sole proprietorship “wrapped up” in 2011 and that he spent months after that remodeling his home and applying
for jobs. Sheridan Dec., Ex. 10 at 46:15-47:14. Unlike the resume given to SCL, in the deposition, Trout admitted
that he “wasn't currently employed” when he applied to work at SCL. *Id.*

1 record of domestic violence under the name Jon Maurer before changing his name to Jon
2 Trout. Sheridan Dec., Ex. 14 at 125:8-131:14; Sheridan Dec., Ex. 10 at 43:14-46:14 at 22:6-
3 28:11. A colleague described Wernli and Trout’s learning curve at SCL after they hired them
4 in 2012, as like “drinking from [a] fire hose.” Gamble Dec., Ex. 16 at 13527-0001.

5 **D. In April 2012, Gamble applied for an Electrical Service Engineer (“ESE”) job, but**
6 **a much younger male applicant who lacked her experience was selected.**


7 On April 2, 2012, just days after having been hired himself, David Wernli was made
8 hiring manager for an out-of-class (“OOC) **Electrical Services Engineer (“ESE”)** job. *See*
9 Sheridan Dec., Ex. 15; Wernli Dec., ¶ 3. Gamble had already worked out-of-class as an ESE
10 for more than a year between 2009 and 2010, and had received glowing performance reviews
11 for that assignment. Gamble Dec., ¶ 4; Sheridan Dec., Exs. 20 and 21. Manager Leuschen
12 testifies, “ESE and ESR are not that different,” noting “Jackie Smith went from senior ESR to
13 the ESE position and did just fine.” Sheridan Dec., Ex. 5, ¶ 18. Director Enright testified in a
14 general sense “ESEs do a very similar thing” to ESRs and provide the same type of advice; the
15 difference is “[m]ainly ... the size of the service and the type of job” on which they’re advising
16 customers.” *See* Sheridan Dec., Ex. 6 at 14:4-16:2.

17 Ian Cooper is an ESE. Sheridan Dec., Ex. 16 at 5:14. Like Ms. Gamble, Mr. Cooper has
18 no engineering degree. *Id.*, at 9:4-5. Cooper testified that the lack of an engineering degree has
19 never been an issue with management or in his work, and was not a requirement for him when
20 he was hired as an ESE in about 2010. *Id.*, at 9:4-8; 27:25-28:17. The Customer Care Director,
21 Kelly Enright, was one of the hiring authorities when Cooper was promoted to ESE. *Id.*, at
22 9:25-10:2. Prior to being promoted to ESE, Cooper, like Gamble, worked as an “out-of-class
23 **ESR supervisor** for about a two to three-year time period,” and then permanently as ESR
24 Supervisor for “[n]ot a long time[,] [m]aybe a year or two.” *Id.*, at 7:15-22. Mr. Cooper
25 testified that when Plaintiff Gamble worked with him during her prior out-of-class assignment

1 as an ESE (2010-11), she “did a fine job. She did as good a job as I did.” Sheridan Dec., Ex.
2 16.

3 Ms. Gamble applied for the out-of-class ESE job posted in April 2012 and was
4 unanimously rated “high” at the resume review stage. Wernli Dec., ¶ 3. She and a second
5 candidate, Benjamin Rushwald, were given interviews. *Id.* At the time, Ms. Gamble was 53
6 years old and Mr. Rushwald was 31 years old. Sheridan Dec., Ex. 9 at 3. Rushwald had B.S.
7 and M.S. degrees in Mechanical Engineering and had been working at SCL since only 2011, as
8 a Power Analyst. Sheridan Dec., Ex. 18. He did not have Gamble’s broad experience in the
9 work performed by ESEs. ESE Ian Cooper was involved in training Rushwald after he was
10 ultimately selected for the ESE job, and Cooper was asked in his deposition, “When
11 [Rushwald] first came to you, what if anything, did he know about the position?” Cooper
12 replied, “**Nothing, really.** I think he had some electrical background and had worked at City
13 Light in another position, so was a member of City Light but **really had never done the type**
14 **of work that an ESE does.**” Sheridan Dec., Ex. 16 at 24:19-25:6.

15 The interview panel for the out-of-class ESE assignment included three persons;
16 Director Enright, her subordinate (Manager Wernli), and Wernli’s direct report, an ESE (Abdi
17 Yussuf). *See* Sheridan Dec., Ex. 19; Sheridan Dec., Ex. 6 at 39:13-40:19. The panel
18 unanimously rated both Ms. Gamble and Mr. Rushwald “high.” Sheridan Dec., Ex. 19.
19 According to SCL’s investigation, “there was a lengthy discussion about which candidate was
20 a better fit.” Sheridan Dec., Ex. 9 at 3. On Director Enright’s interview rating form, she wrote
21 as to Mr. Rushwald, “very good technically,” and as to Ms. Gamble, “strong background /
22 could hit ground running.” Sheridan Dec., Ex. 19 at CITYLIGHT016013. Director Enright also
23 circled the name of Ms. Gamble—not Mr. Rushwald.



1 Manager Wernli wrote on his rating sheet about Mr. Rushwald, “Good on theoretical – **less**
2 **electr. experience,**” and about Gamble wrote only positive comments (“Good experience,
3 good relationships, **good fit**”). *Id.* at CITYLIGHT016009 (bold added).

4 Director Enright later told SCL’s investigator that “she, in consultation with the hiring
5 panel, made the final decision that Mr. Rushwald was the best candidate.” Sheridan Dec., Ex. 9
6 at CITYLIGHT015168. In defending that decision, Enright told the investigator, “[I]t is rare to
7 have an ESE without an engineering degree.” Sheridan Dec., Ex. 9 at CITYLIGHT015168.
8 Again, Ian Cooper testified that he was promoted to ESE without an engineering degree, and
9 that Director Enright was a hiring authority for his promotion. Sheridan Dec., Ex. 16 at 9:4-
10 10:2; 27:25-28:17.

11 Director Enright admitted in her deposition to having prior knowledge about Gamble.
12 Enright knew that Gamble “had back problems.” Sheridan Dec., Ex. 6 at 47:13-48:21. Enright
13 testified that at least by the time Gamble “was working in the ESE position in an out-of-class
14 role [in 2009 and 2010] I became aware of that. ... Because she had to miss time from work...
15 [o]wing to back problems.” *Id.*¹¹

16 On May 10, 2012, H.R. informed Gamble that she was not selected for the OOC ESE
17 position. Gamble immediately responded to H.R.’s email: “What? I did this job for over year!”
18 Sheridan Dec., Ex. 22. H.R. then forwarded Gamble’s email to Manager Wernli, who notified
19 Director Enright of Gamble’s opposition to their non-selection of her. *Id.* Wernli emailed
20 Enright that he would talk with Gamble, writing, “If she is there would rather talk with her in-
21 person (Can’t remember if this is her day off...).” Sheridan Dec., Ex. 22 (ellipsis in original).

22 On May 21, 2012, Wernli emailed Director Enright to notify her Gamble was off work,
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24

25 ¹¹ Gamble’s supervisor for the out-of-class ESE assignment, Margy Jones, wrote on her performance evaluation for the job that “Toni has very good attendance and always lets management as well as co-workers know when she is going to be un-available,” rating her as “Exceeding Expectations” for Job Reliability/Initiative. Sheridan Dec., Ex. 20 at CITYLIGHT000183.

1 having a hard time breathing; Enright responded, “That is sad that Toni is going through
2 this...but not surprising about missing work.” Sheridan Dec., Ex. 23. When Gamble emailed
3 her supervisor, Bryan Leuschen, a note from her treating physician to return to work days later,
4 copying Manager Wernli on the message, Wernli forwarded the information to Enright
5 (dropping Leuschen off the email chain) and questioned the validity of the note, asking
6 Enright, “Who is this quack?” Sheridan Dec., Ex. 1. Enright wrote in reply, “**This is why I was**
7 **worried before regarding attendance.” *Id.* (emphasis added). In her deposition, when Enright
8 was asked, “ Did you have concerns that [Gamble] was missing too much work?” Enright
9 denied any concerns: “No, I had concerns that the group was struggling to meet the needs of
10 the business.” Sheridan Dec., Ex. 6 at 73:1-25. Director Enright agreed that it would be
11 improper to criticize or penalize an employee for taking approved vacation; and in Ms.
12 Enright’s words, “illegal” to criticize or penalize an employee for taking approved FMLA. *Id.*
13 *See also* Sheridan Dec., Ex. 25 (City Light’s FMLA Policy: “Supervisors must not reference an
14 employee’s FML absences in any discussions regarding absenteeism, productivity,
15 performance, etc. The supervisor must not use the taking of FML as a basis for any adverse
16 personnel action, nor as a reason to deny a benefit or working condition for which the
17 employee would otherwise be eligible.”). Director Enright admits that Gamble has never been
18 accused or investigated for inappropriately taking time off. Sheridan Dec., Ex. 6 at 74:7-13.**

19 **E. Shortly after Wernli hired Trout, Gamble reported that Trout was mistreating her**
20 **in regards to protected sick leave and treating her and other women differently.**

21 On August 29, 2012, Jon Trout was hired by SCL and became the supervisor of Ms.
22 Gamble. Sheridan Dec., Ex. 9 at 2. Within days (September 4, 2012), Trout was tracking
23 Gamble’s attendance. *See discussion, infra.* On September 11, 2012, Gamble emailed Trout
24 about telecommuting, writing in relevant part:

25 If you would like to discuss some telecommuting options, I would be happy to listen
(see personnel rule 9.2...), in particular rule 9.2.3. When I chose the ‘training

1 supervisor position' (I had previously supervised the Commercial ESR's) I was advised
2 by my manager that there would be an opportunity for some telecommuting in this
3 position. **This is especially useful when trying to complete a project without**
4 **interruptions, such as researching to develop training programs, re-writing the**
5 **RESC manual, up-dating CESIP documents....** Occasionally, Snoqualmie Pass is
6 closed, due to weather and avalanche control, and I have been able to use this option,
7 with the consent of my Manager.

8 Sheridan Dec., Ex. 26 (bold added). At his deposition, Trout was shown the September 11th
9 email and agreed he discussed telecommuting with Gamble. When asked, "Can you tell us why
10 you told [Gamble] she could not telecommute?" Trout answered, "I made it a policy that
11 **everyone** needed to report to the office because we were working with a lot of customers that
12 needed people to be on site." Sheridan Dec., Ex. 14 at 84:13-85:12. On September 17, 2012,
13 Trout similarly wrote Gamble, "[a]s for the topic of telecommuting, **I don't think**
14 **telecommuting makes sense for any of our work activities in the customer care group. We**
15 **all need to be present** in order to optimize our communication with each other and our
16 customers." Sheridan Dec., Ex. 27 (emphasis added). In his declaration, Trout admits he
17 allowed one of Gamble's coworkers to "work[] on **revising** the Residential Electrical Service
18 Code [**RESC**]- a concrete project with a fixed and tangible deliverable." Trout Dec., ¶ 11.
19 When Gamble asked on September 11th to "develop training programs, **re-writ[e] the RESC**
20 **manual, [or] up-dat[e] CESIP documents"** from home, she was denied. Sheridan Dec., Ex. 27.

21 Between September and December 2012, Trout kept a "running log" in which he
22 tracked Gamble's attendance. Sheridan Dec., Ex. 28; Sheridan Dec., Ex. 14 at 85:18-86:11.
23 Trout's log references, *inter alia*, communications he received from Gamble about her being
24 absent for doctor's appointments; for her own illness; for "family SL" [sick leave]; and related
25 to her being late owing to the effects of medication. *See* Sheridan Dec., Ex. 28. In the log Trout
kept, he included this quotation from an email Gamble sent him on October 2, 2012 in
response to an email he sent her under the Subject line "Consistency of your work schedule":
"Jon, Perhaps you should become familiar with our Sick Leave Policy before making these

1 accusations. **I am under the care of my physician for my illness and I will be contacting**
2 **our HR Department regarding your treatment and accusations.**” Sheridan Dec., Ex. 28 at
3 CITYLIGHT002890, 2892. Gamble made good on her promise. That same day, she forwarded
4 the email chain with Trout to H.R., provided a copy to the Director of H.R., DaVonna Johnson,
5 and asked how to “go about filing a complaint. Gamble Dec., Ex. 5 at GAM00042; Sheridan
6 Dec., Ex. 2 at CITYLIGHT011322. Gamble was directed to Employee Relations, who she
7 wrote, in relevant part, “This is one of many complaints that I have with this manager, not to
8 mention other things that have been bothering me regarding the inconsistencies with the
9 application of policies, OOC [out-of-class] assignments, and overtime.” Gamble Dec., Ex. 5 at
10 GAM00042.

11 On October 22, 2012, less than two months after Trout was made Gamble’s manager,
12 she was again emailing management to report Trout’s adverse treatment. Gamble wrote
13 Director Enright an email under the Subject line: “Issues with new manager,” asking her “how
14 [Trout] met the qualifications for this job?” Sheridan Dec., Ex. 24. Gamble wrote to Enright
15 about Trout, *inter alia*:

16 He is a terrible communicator and cannot seem to make up his mind on what direction
17 he wants me to go in, with the training for our units. I have been pulled in at least 8
18 different directions and I get the feeling he is **setting me up for failure**. Whenever I
19 think we have an understanding on something, he changes the game plan. When I
20 deliver a finished training module, he thinks it is incomplete. He asks me to arrange the
21 scheduling with the Supervisors, then he goes ahead and sets things up himself (without
22 advising the supervisors or me). I have always strived to be a good communicator and
23 employee, and have never had such a hard time pleasing anyone.

24 For some reason both the managers [Trout and Wernli] think Jeff Jones is the greatest
25 (what does that tell you about them) and he still can't show up for work on time. **Do**
they just not like women? as both Annie & Melissa are getting the run around too.

Sheridan Dec., Ex. 24.

Director Enright responded to Gamble, “I am very sorry to hear this. Honestly I have
heard nothing but good things about Jon. Thank you for bringing it to my attention. I will be

1 investigating the allegations you have shared.” *Id.* After receiving this email, Enright did not
2 report Gamble’s concerns to H.R., nor forward H.R. her email. Sheridan Dec., Ex. 6 at 69:11-
3 70:6. Nor did Director Enright meet with Ms. Gamble. *Id.*; Gamble Dec., ¶ 34. Enright claims
4 that after receiving the October 22nd email, she “start[ed] talking to the supervisors to get their
5 impression of what was going on.” Sheridan Dec., Ex. 6 at 64:10-65:20 (testifying she spoke
6 with Allan Yamaguchi, Tief Weller, Anne Albertson, Max Castillo and “was having regular
7 contact with Melissa Picken”). If true, Enright did not “document in any way the fact that [she]
8 had these conversations.” Sheridan Dec., Ex. 6 at 70:16-24. When Trout was asked in his
9 deposition if Enright had discussed the content of Gamble’s email with him, Trout answered,
10 “I don’t recall.” Sheridan Dec., Ex. 10 at 64:7-66:23.

11 **F. In December 2012, As The Result of Rushwald’s Prior Selection (And Gamble’s**
12 **Non-selection) for OOC ESE, Rushwald Is Selected to Permanently Fill the ESE**
13 **Job And Gamble Objects to the H.R. Director About His Selection.**

14 In November 2012, SCL posted a request for applications relating to a permanent ESE
15 assignment. Wernli Dec., ¶ 5. “This was the position for which Mr. Rushwald had previously
16 been hired on an OOC basis.” *Id.* Again, Gamble applied to be assigned the ESE job she had
17 previously performed successfully on an OOC basis. On November 21, 2012, Ian Cooper
18 (himself an ESE) rated resumes of six applicants for the job and gave Gamble’s resume a
19 “high” rating; while Trout, who lacked any experience in the position Gamble was applying
20 for, rated Gamble’s resume only “medium.” Sheridan Dec., Ex. 29. On December 4, 2012, all
21 six applicants were interviewed by hiring manager David Wernli and two others. Wernli Dec.,
22 ¶ 5. Wernli and the panel then rated Gamble “medium” and Rushwald “high,” and selected
23 Rushwald for the permanent ESE assignment. *Id.* Wernli testifies that Rushwald’s
24 “qualifications had improved since his hire in April 2012 ... because he had been working
25 OOC in the ESE position for more than six months.” *Id.*

1 On December 14, 2012, Gamble wrote the H.R. Director, DaVonna Johnson, who is a
2 direct report to SCL Superintendent Jorge Carrasco, to file “an official complaint” about the
3 hiring process for the Electrical Service Engineer job. Gamble Dec., Ex. 8. Gamble wrote that
4 “the person chosen (Ben Rushwald) has minimal experience in this position or this type of
5 work, compared to other candidates in the hiring process.” She further stated, in part:

6 He was also favored in the OOC hire earlier this year, as managements’ excuse was that
7 they ‘wanted to give him a try.’ This does very little for morale in the workgroup,
8 where the focus is to promote from within, and the ESE’s needed someone who could
9 step in and help them with their workload. Ben Rushwald doesn’t have the experience
or training to do the job! ... I feel very strongly that this hire is un-fair and has upper
management involvement.

10 Gamble Dec., Ex. 8.

11 In the investigation that followed this complaint, Senior Electrical Engineer Specialist
12 Minh Ta told the investigator he “believes that Ms. Gamble was more qualified for the job
13 based on her experience than Mr. Rushwald.” Sheridan Dec., Ex. 9 at 5. When Trout was asked
14 in his deposition if “in your communications with Mr. Wernli you basically said that you felt
15 that Ms. Gamble had serious problems regarding her attendance,” Trout responded, “David
16 Wernli and I both were concerned about Toni Gamble’s attendance.” Sheridan Dec., Ex. 14 at
17 108:3-8. Again, Wernli was the hiring manager when Ms. Gamble was rejected for the
18 permanent ESE job.

19 **G. After Gamble Complained About Trout, He Gave Her a *De Facto* Demotion, While**
20 **Another Female Employee Complained to H.R. about His Treatment of Women.**

21 In mid-December, Trout assigned Gamble, who was a *Supervising* ESR “to do the
22 work of a Senior ESR in the Queen Anne and Magnolia neighborhoods.” Sheridan Dec., Ex. 30
23 at 256:6-258:2. Gamble testified that while “[i]t wasn’t a demotion in pay; it was kind of a
24 demotion to me just because I got put in a lower position, and there were other people that
25 probably could have done that, but yet I was sent there. So in my mind I felt like I was being
punished.” *Id.* For example, “[t]here was a person working out of class named Maneet Jain,

1 who it was his job that [Gamble] was filling in. So why didn't they bring him back. He was in
2 an out-of-class position, [Gamble] was in a permanent position." *Id.* at 258:16-22. While
3 Senior ESR duties became Gamble's "main assignment," at the same time, she "had multiple
4 jobs. [She] had also been asked to try to keep a training portion going, which was just not –
5 [she] just didn't have enough time with the busy area that [she] was assigned to." Sheridan
6 Dec., Ex. 31 at 198:20-199:5. A subsequent investigation by City Light included an interview
7 of Supervising ESR Allan Yamaguchi regarding Gamble's complaints against Trout that
8 confirms Gamble's perception of events. The investigator's notes of her interview with
9 Yamaguchi state, *inter alia*:

10 [Trout] elected her to be the training coordinator. With that, she had responsibility to
11 develop training program and getting approved and implemented. Concept is good. But,
12 in his opinion, **they set [her] up to fail. They kept changing her direction as training
13 coordinator, her level of responsibility, the product having to develop, and then
14 put into role of being service rep in a district. ESR role to deal with customers and
15 then was still responsible for training piece as well – although they understand that
16 had ESR role as well. They asked her several times to produce this, but she could not
17 because she was busy. ... Purposefully adding a lot of stuff on her plate.**

18 Gamble Dec., Ex. 16 at 13527-0001 – 0002.

19 Yamaguchi also reported to the investigator that he "he believes [Gamble] is
20 legitimately using" her authorized leave. *Id.* at 13527-0002.

21 In mid-December, around the same time that Gamble sent her complaint to H.R. about
22 her non-selection for ESE, a second complaint alleging discrimination in the Customer Care
23 division was brought to H.R.'s attention. Director Enright testified that after Gamble wrote her
24 in October about Mr. Trout, Enright began "having regular conversations" with Melissa Picken
25 regarding Trout; and that on December 21, 2012, Enright "brought Melissa [Picken]'s concerns
to HR," which led to an investigation into whether Trout's treatment of Picken was "gender
discrimination." Sheridan Dec., Ex. 6 at 67:5-22. The investigation that was conducted by Kate
McMahan included interviews of five Supervising ESRs, but curiously (given that Picken

1 alleged gender discrimination) omitted any interview of Ms. Gamble, who had previously told
2 Enright that Trout does “not like women.” *See* Gamble Dec., Ex. 17 at 2, 9; Sheridan Dec., Ex.
3 24.¹²

4 **H. Gamble Again Asked Trout To Be Allowed To Telecommute and Accused Him of**
5 **Different Treatment When She Was Denied, After Which Trout Gave Her An**
6 **Adverse Performance Evaluation.**

7 On January 31, 2013, Ms. Gamble wrote Mr. Trout, in relevant part, “I would like to try
8 and take care of some of my workload from home and answer customers inquiries (my e-mails
9 are impossible to get through), perhaps 3-4 hours at the most each day?? I have research to do
10 on many jobs that I can accomplish from home using my VPN account.” Sheridan Dec., Ex. 32
11 at 1. Trout responded, “In regards to working from home: Your request is not approved. I think
12 it would be much better to work on these Magnolia/ Queen Anne district projects from the
13 NSC where you have all the resources you need.” *Id.* Trout made no claim to Gamble at the
14 time that he was applying a so-called “rule in the Customer Engineering group that an
15 employee could only telecommute if he or she were working on a project with tangible and
16 measurable benchmarks and had previously demonstrated reliability.” *Compare id. with* Def.’s
17 Mot. at 7, fn.2 (*citing* Trout Decl. ¶ 11); *see also* Sheridan Dec., Ex. 9 at 13. The City has
18 identified no employee (other than Ms. Gamble) who was denied a request to telecommute
19 based on application of such alleged rule. On January 31, 2013, in response to Trout again
20 denying her request to telecommute, Gamble wrote:

21
22 I had some work to take care of today, so I have already worked 2 hrs from home, due
23 to my emergency. I know **you have allowed others to do this, so I’m not sure why**
24 **you don’t want me to keep somewhat caught up** on my work?? But that’s fine with

25

¹² Four of the five Supervising ESRs that McMahan interviewed in the Picken’s investigation were also interviewed by Meghan Frazer in the context of Toni Gamble’s discrimination against Trout. *See id.*

1 me, if that's the level of customer service you want from me. This is not a frequent
2 request, but **has been approved by you for others in the past.**

3 Sheridan Dec., Ex. 32 at 1.

4 Trout did not respond to explain why Gamble was being treated differently, but instead
5 forwarded Gamble's email to his boss, Wernli. Sheridan Dec., Ex. 33.

6 On February 11, 2013, Employee Relations advisor and attorney Meghan Frazer
7 interviewed Gamble about her complaints, and based on the information Gamble provided in
8 the interview, the next day sent Gamble a formal EEO Complaint form to complete. *See*
9 Sheridan Dec., Ex. 34. Gamble returned the complaint form on February 15, 2013, and as the
10 basis for the complaint, checked boxes for "age," "disability," "gender," "family and medical
11 leave," "failure to accommodate," and "retaliation." The narrative description stated in relevant
12 part: "I have 2 new managers hired within the last year, Jon Trout & David Wernli, who have
13 discriminated against me in the hiring process and day to day activities due to age, gender,
14 FML, and accommodation issues. I have documented this treatment and have co-worker's
15 statements to establish the discriminatory work environment that I am forced to endure."

16 Sheridan Dec., Ex. 34.

17 On February 15, 2013, in an email to Trout Gamble wrote, "[a]s I have said before, you
18 have approved work from home for other Supervisors and I feel that I am being discriminated
19 against by you, regarding this issue and many other Supervisory issues as well." Sheridan Dec.,
20 Ex. 34. Trout did not address Gamble's accusation of discrimination when he replied, but did
21 copy his manager (David Wernli) on the chain, ensuring that Wernli was also aware of
22 Gamble's allegations. *Id.* Gamble, for her part, forwarded the email alleging discrimination to
23 Director Enright, writing, "I feel that I cannot tolerate this harassment any longer, and request
24 relief". Gamble Dec., Ex. 11.

25 Nine days later, on February 26, 2013, Trout gave Gamble an extremely critical
performance evaluation, which David Wernli and Kelly Enright each reviewed and approved.

1 See Sheridan Dec., Ex. 14 at 108:9-21. Upon receiving the evaluation, Gamble was compelled
2 to write to investigator Frazer and to Labor Relations about it, reporting:

3 [M]y performance evaluation mentions not only my current FML absences but also any
4 time I was off over the last three years! This is outrageous, he has no idea what my past
5 absences have been for! There are more ‘observations’ that he has made about me that
6 are un-true. ... [H]e has only worked here for 4 months, and he has stated that I was a
7 bad supervisor when I supervised people years ago! ...

8 Gamble Dec., Ex. 18. A copy of the signed Performance Evaluation was forwarded to Labor
9 Relations and to investigator Frazer on March 1, 2013, with a note “to add this to the current
10 claim I have regarding Jon Trout. This is personal assault against me not my performance. This
11 PE is a lie, contradiction, immature, and breaches Personnel Rules regarding FML and L&I
12 injury.” See Sheridan Dec., Ex. 35. Among other things, the evaluation states:

13 Toni’s reliability and productivity is hindered by extraordinarily large number of hours
14 she is not at work. Based on the review of **historical attendance records, over the past
15 three years Toni has been absent from work a total of 3,682 hours, that’s 59% of a
16 normal full time work schedule of 6,420.** ... Toni is expected to demonstrate a
17 consistent pattern of attendance....

18 *Id.* at CITYLIGHT015329.

19 The evaluation also includes the enigmatically stated, in part:

20 [Toni’s] positive relationship qualities are undermined at times by Toni’s habit of
21 making **derogatory comments about other people behind their backs. In many
22 cases these indirect negative remarks find their way back to their target** and serve
23 to create an environment of mistrust and disrespect.

24 *Id.*

25 Although Wernli reviewed and approved this language, he testified that he did not
recall Trout communicating that Gamble was making derogatory comments about other
people, or Gamble being counseled or disciplined for such alleged conduct. Sheridan Dec., Ex.
11 at 49:17-50:6.

In his deposition, Trout confirmed that a copy of this performance evaluation is found

1 in Trout’s “Supervisor File.” *Compare* Sheridan Dec., Ex. 10 at 16:16-18:5 (confirming
2 CITYLIGHT 2866–2924 are Supervisor File) *with* Sheridan Dec., Ex. 36. He also testified that
3 he did not believe the evaluation was changed at all after Gamble filed a grievance in regards
4 to the evaluation. Sheridan Dec., Ex. 14 at 108:13-25. In the subsequent union grievance,
5 Gamble claimed the evaluation was “designed to degrade, harass, and discriminate against”
6 her, and she “corrected the record” providing a detailed response to each area of the evaluation.
7 *See* Tort Claim, at 23-26 (Manville Dec., Ex. A, at Gamble Dep. Ex. 16, pp. 23-26 (Appx. D)).

8 In May 2013, while Gamble was on leave for a work-related injury, Meghan Frazer
9 interviewed witnesses about her discrimination complaint. A draft report from the investigation
10 was circulated that same month, leading Wernli to counsel Trout at the time about making
11 “derogatory comments in front of his supervisors” about Ms. Gamble. Sheridan Dec., Ex. 3.
12 Frazer’s investigation found, *inter alia*, that Trout had told other supervisors that **Gamble has**
13 **“a perpetual excuse for not coming in to work” and “keeps sending in doctor’s notes that**
14 **she needs to stay home.”** Sheridan Dec., Ex. 4; Sheridan Dec., Ex. 9 at 23. After Frazer’s
15 report was made final, H.R. advised Director Enright to counsel Trout to “exercise good
16 judgment as a manager in his communication with staff concerning protected activity,” and to
17 “not make comments that could appear to discourage his staff from accessing or taking FML
18 leave,” which Enright promised to do. Sheridan Dec., Ex. 4.

19 Frazer’s investigation also confirmed that Gamble was not alone in feeling that Trout
20 mistreats women. Melissa Picken told the investigator, “Trout does not treat women the same
21 way he treats men” and “does not solicit input from women and ignores women.” Sheridan
22 Dec., Ex. 9 at 15. Trout testified that he gave Melissa Picken a performance evaluation that
23 was “below average or needs improvement.” Sheridan Dec., Ex. 14 at 97:9-14. The
24 investigator interviewed Supervising ESR Allan Yamaguchi about Gamble’s complaint against
25 Trout and notes of that interview state, *inter alia*:

1 Why treat differentl[y]? Gut tells him its primarily personalities. Also **thinks there are**
2 **some issues with women**. Yesterday’s supervisory [meeting] was most classic
example. Applauds work that Tief and him do, but leaves Melissa [Picken] out – just as
important in work she does. **It was insulting. Melissa was sitting right next to him.**

3 Gamble Dec., Ex. 16 at 13527-0003; *accord id.* at 13527-0001 (“Treats Melissa differently?
4 Yes. Whether conscious or not. He will talk to Tief and Him, but not stop at Melissa’s office.”)

5 Although the investigator found that Trout’s derogatory comments about Gamble’s use
6 of leave violated City Light’s policies, she declined to find that Trout or City Light engaged in
7 unlawful discrimination. *See* Sheridan Dec., Ex. 9 at 1. Frazer no longer works for the City,
8 having recently joined a law firm where she mostly defends municipalities. Sheridan Dec., Ex.
9 37 at 4:14-5:5. She testified that during her tenure at Seattle City Light she conducted “close to
10 50” investigations but cannot recall ever once making a finding of discrimination. *See* Sheridan
11 Dec., Ex. 37 at 32:3-20. Even still, in the report concerning Gamble, Frazer recognized:

12 Here, Ms. **Gamble’s complaint likely establishes a *prima facie* case**, at least with
13 respect to her claim under the ADEA.¹³ With respect to her claim based on the ADEA,
14 Ms. Gamble is 53 years old, applied for and was qualified for the OOC and permanent
ESE position, was not offered the position, and the position went to a 31 year old.
15 Sheridan Dec., Ex. 9; Sheridan Dec., Ex. 37 at 39:25-40:6.

16 17 **III. ISSUES PRESENTED**

- 18 1. Whether Plaintiff raises a genuine issue of fact as to whether she was subject to
19 disparate treatment based on her gender, age, and/or record or history of disability? Yes.
- 20 2. Whether Plaintiff raises a genuine issue of fact as to whether she was subject to a
21 hostile work environment based on her gender and/or record or history of disability? Yes.
- 22 3. Whether Plaintiff raises a genuine issue of fact as to whether she was subject to
23 retaliation in violation of the Washington Law Against Discrimination? Yes.
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¹³ ADEA is the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.

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IV. ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITY

A. Standard of Review

Under CR 56, all facts and inferences are viewed in the light most favorable to Ms. Gamble, as the Court “disregard[s] all evidence favorable to the moving party that the jury is not required to believe.”¹⁴ “The Court ... may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence.”¹⁵ “[T]he court must review the record ‘taken as a whole,’”¹⁶ and “[a]ll of the evidence - whether direct or indirect - is to be considered cumulatively.”¹⁷ If there is a genuine issue as to any material fact, a trial is “absolutely necessary.”¹⁸

“[S]ummary judgment to an employer is **seldom appropriate** in the WLAD cases because of the difficulty of proving a discriminatory motivation.” Scrivener, 181 Wn.2d at 445, *citing Sangster*, 99 Wn. App. at 160 (“Summary judgment should rarely be granted in employment discrimination cases.”); *accord Davis v. West One Automotive Group*, 140 Wn. App. 449, 456, 166 P.3d 807 (2007) (Stephens, J.). Plaintiffs “need produce very little evidence in order to overcome an employer’s motion for summary judgment ... [as] the ultimate question is one that can only be resolved through a searching inquiry – one that is most appropriately conducted by a factfinder, upon a full record.” Chuang v. Univ. of Cal. Davis, 225 F.3d 1115, 1124 (9th Cir. 2000).

“[T]he employee’s task at the summary judgment stage is limited to showing that a reasonable trier of fact could, but not necessarily would, draw the inference that [gender, age, disability, or retaliation] was a [‘substantial factor’] in the decision.”¹⁹ Washington courts, while often utilizing the *McDonnell Douglas* approach, have repeatedly cautioned it is to be used

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¹⁴ Reeves, 530 U.S. at 151.

¹⁵ *Id.*, at 150.

¹⁶ Reeves, 530 U.S. at 150.

¹⁷ Raad v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough Sch. Dist., 323 F.3d 1185, 1194 (9th Cir. 2003).

¹⁸ Balise v. Underwood, 62 Wn.2d 195, 199, 381 P.2d 966 (1963).

¹⁹ *See Johnson*, 80 Wn. App. at 230; *accord Scrivener*, 181 Wn.2d at 445.

1 “flexibly,”²⁰ and that “[a]bove all, it should not be viewed as providing a format into which all
2 cases of discrimination must somehow fit.” Grimwood v. Univ. of Puget Sound, Inc., 110
3 Wn.2d 355, 363, 753 P.2d 517 (1988). “Proof of different treatment by way of comparator
4 evidence is relevant and admissible but not required.” Johnson v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 159
5 Wn. App. 18, 33, 244 P.3d 438, 446 (2010). “A plaintiff who chooses not to rely on *McDonnell*
6 *Douglas* can still meet his or her burden of production in any way that yields evidence from
7 which a rational trier of fact could find unlawful discrimination by a preponderance of the
8 evidence.” Parsons v. St. Joseph's Hosp. and Health Care Ctr., 70 Wn.App. 804, 809, 856 P.2d
9 702 (1993).²¹ “[C]ircumstantial, indirect and inferential evidence will suffice to discharge the
10 plaintiff’s burden.”²²

11 **B. Gamble raises an issue of fact as to whether she was subject to disparate treatment**
12 **based on her gender, age, and/or record or history of disability.**

13 Plaintiff succeeds on her disparate treatment claim by showing (1) that Defendant “did
14 not promote” her and (2) that her disability, age, or gender was “a substantial factor” in the
15 decision not to promote her. *See, e.g., Johnson v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc.*, 159 Wn. App. 18, 33,
16 n.32, 244 P.3d 438 (2010), *citing* 6A Wash. Practice: Wash. Pattern Jury Instructions: Civil
17 330.01, at 307 (5th ed. 2005) (“Disparate Treatment—Burden of Proof”). It is undisputed that
18 City Light took an adverse employment action by denying Ms. Gamble promotions. Kuest v.
19 Regent Assisted Living, Inc., 111 Wn. App. 36, 44, 43 P.3d 23 (2002) (“[A]n adverse
20 employment decision includ[es] ... denial of promotion.”). Thus, the only issue is whether
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23 ²⁰ *Id.*, *citing Texas Dept. of Comm’y Affairs v. Burdine*, 450 U.S. 248, 253-55 (1981).

24 ²¹ *Accord Lowe v. City of Monrovia*, 775 F.2d 998, 1009 (9th Cir. 1985), amended, 784 F.2d 1407 (9th Cir. 1986)
25 (“[A] plaintiff may establish a *prima facie* case of disparate treatment by satisfying the *McDonnell Douglas* four-
part test, thereby creating a rebuttable presumption of discriminatory treatment, or by presenting actual evidence,
direct or circumstantial, of the employer’s discriminatory motive.”).

²² Hill v. BCTI Income Fund-I, 144 Wn.2d 172, 180, 23 P.3d 440 (2001), *overruled in part on other grounds by*
McClarty v. Totem Elec., 157 Wn.2d 214, 137 P.3d 844 (2006).

1 Gamble’s protected statuses (gender, age, and/or disability) were a “substantial factor” in such
2 the denial of promotion.

3 It is the plaintiff’s burden at trial to prove that discrimination was a substantial factor in
4 an adverse employment action, not the only motivating factor. An employer may be
5 motivated by multiple purposes, both legitimate and illegitimate, when making
employment decisions and still be liable....

6 Scrivener, 181 Wn.2d at 447 (discussing WLAD case). Substantial factor does *not* mean
7 Gamble would have been promoted “but for” her gender, age, or disability. WPI 330.01.01;
8 Wilmot, 118 Wn.2d at 71-73 (“[T]he plaintiff may respond to the employer’s articulated reason
9 ... by showing that although the employer’s stated reason is legitimate, [gender, age, or
10 disability] was nevertheless a *substantial factor* motivating the employer”)

11 **1. There is ample evidence of animus toward Gamble’s disability.**

12 Relevant, circumstantial evidence of discrimination includes “remarks” about an
13 employee’s protected status, even if “not made directly in the context of an employment
14 decision or uttered by a non-decision-maker.” Scrivener, 181 Wn.2d at 450, n.3. Under the
15 definition of disability applicable to WLAD claims, where disability includes a “record or
16 history” of a disability, RCW 49.60.040(7)(a), in addition to “conduct resulting from a
17 disability,” Riehl, 152 Wn.2d at 152, Defendant’s managers and decision-makers (Enright,
18 Wernli and Trout) continually made critical and derogatory remarks about Gamble’s disability.
19 *See, e.g.*, Sheridan Dec., Ex. 1 (Emails dated 5/29/12, in which Wernli writes about Gamble’s
20 treating physician, “Who is this quack?” and Director Enright responds, “This is why I was
21 worried before regarding attendance” within weeks of denying Gamble promotion); Sheridan
22 Dec., Ex. 23 (Email dated 5/21/12, Enright writes: “That is sad that Toni is going through
23 this...but not surprising about missing work.”); Sheridan Dec., Ex. 4 (Trout says Gamble has “a
24 perpetual excuse for not coming in to work” and “keeps sending in doctor’s notes that she
25 needs to stay home.”); Sheridan Dec., Ex. 35 (Trout with the review and approval of Wernli
and Enright, criticizes Gamble about her “attendance records, over the past three years”); and

1 Sheridan Dec., Ex. 28 (Trout immediately begins tracking Gamble’s absences and labels her
2 “Dr. appt.” an “excuse”). “When the plaintiff offers [such] direct evidence²³ of discriminatory
3 motive ... a triable issue as to the actual motivation of the employer is created even if the
4 evidence is not substantial.” Estevez v. Faculty Club of University of Washington, 129 Wn.
5 App. 774, 801, 120 P.3d 579 (2005).

6 **2. The fact that Gamble’s age and gender were factors in the denial of**
7 **promotion can be inferred from the circumstances.**

8 Using the “flexible” *McDonnell Douglas* framework, Gamble “can establish a prima
9 facie case of ... discrimination based on (1) her being a woman [or over 40 years old], (2) her
10 being qualified for the position, (3) her not having been offered the position, and (4)
11 [Defendant’s] awarding the permanent position to a male [or significantly younger person].”
12 See Fulton v. State, Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 169 Wn. App. 137, 156-57, 279 P.3d 500
13 (2012); Hill v. BCTI Income Fund-I, 144 Wn.2d 172, 188, 23 P.3d 440 (2001), *overruled on*
14 *other grounds by* McClarty v. Totem Elec., 157 Wn.2d 214, 137 P.3d 844 (2006), *citing* RCW
15 49.44.090; RCW 49.60.205. Investigator Frazer previously found that Gamble met this criteria
16 and established a “prima facie” case of discrimination. See Sheridan Dec., Ex. 37 at 39:25-
17 40:6; Sheridan Dec., Ex. 9 (“Ms. Gamble is 53 years old, applied for and was **qualified for the**
18 **OOO and permanent ESE position**, was not offered the position, and the position went to a
19 31 year old” male); *see also* Sheridan Dec., Ex. 6 at 49:10-15 (Enright agreed “Gamble
20 actually had worked in the position out of class before,” so there was “no concern[] about
21 whether she could do the job”). Having “establish[ed] a prima facie case, a “legally mandatory,
22 rebuttable presumption of discrimination temporarily takes hold. Fulton, 169 Wn. App. at 149.
23 Defendant’s alleged legitimate discriminatory reason for selecting Rushwald over Gamble is

24 _____
25 ²³ “ ‘Direct ... evidence’ includes discriminatory statements by a decision maker.” Fulton v. State, Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 169 Wn. App. 137, 164, 279 P.3d 500 (2012).

1 that he had degrees in mechanical engineering, which Gamble lacked. *See* Wernli Dec., ¶ 3.
2 Enright told investigator Frazer, “[I]t is rare to have an ESE without an engineering degree and
3 that she believes that a good educational background gives an ESE a ‘leg up.’” Sheridan Dec.,
4 Ex. 9 at 4.

5 Gamble “satisf[ies] the pretext prong by offering sufficient evidence to create a genuine
6 issue of material fact either (1) that the defendant's reason is pretextual or (2) that although the
7 employer’s stated reason is legitimate, discrimination nevertheless was a substantial factor
8 motivating the employer.” Scrivener, 181 Wn.2d at 441-42. “Evidence of superior
9 qualifications *alone* ‘may suffice, at least in some circumstances, to show pretext.’” Dumont v.
10 City of Seattle, 148 Wn. App. 850, 869, 200 P.3d 764 (2009) (emphasis in original). Here, a
11 reasonable jury may find Gamble’s qualifications were superior to Rushwald. She had
12 previously performed successfully as an OOC ESE and had 25 years of experience at the
13 utility, including many years of applicable experience as a Senior ESR and Supervising ESR,
14 which perform work similar to the ESE work. *See* Sheridan Dec., Ex. 19 at
15 CITYLIGHT016009 (Wernli writes for Rushwald, “Good on theoretical – **less electr.**
16 **experience**,” versus only positive comments for Gamble, “Good experience, good
17 relationships, **good fit**”); and Sheridan Dec., Ex. 9 at 5 (Minh Ta told investigator “Gamble
18 was more qualified for the job based on her experience than Mr. Rushwald.”); *see generally*,
19 Gamble Dec., Ex. 2.

20 In addition to superior qualifications, Gamble can also show pretext by “produc[ing]
21 evidence from which a trier of fact could infer that the employer’s ‘articulated reasons’ for the
22 employment decision “were not really motivating factors for the decision” or “were not
23 motivating factors in employment decisions for other employees in the same circumstances.”
24 Dumont, 148 Wn. App. at 867. Here, ESE Cooper testified that the lack of an engineering
25 degree has never been an issue with management or in his work, and was not a requirement for

1 him when he was hired as an ESE in about 2010. *Id.*, at 9:4-8; 27:25-28:17. The Customer Care
2 Director, Kelly Enright, was one of the hiring authorities for Cooper to be promoted to ESE.
3 Sheridan Dec., Ex. 16, at 9:25-10:2; Sheridan Dec., Ex. 6, at 54:21-55:23.

4 The jury can also find Enright’s claim to the investigator that it is “rare to have an ESE
5 without an engineering degree,” Sheridan Dec., Ex. 9 at 4, has no basis in fact. Enright knew
6 that Cooper, the most recent ESE to have been promoted during her tenure had no such degree,
7 and in her deposition named only four (4) ESEs in the group at the time who had engineering
8 degrees. Sheridan Dec., Ex. 6 at 54:4-24. That one out of five ESEs in the group lacked an
9 engineering degree belies most common understandings of the term “*rare*.” “[T]he trier of fact
10 can reasonably infer from the falsity of the explanation that the employer is dissembling to
11 cover up a discriminatory purpose.” *Hill*, 144 Wn.2d at 184, *quoting Reeves*, 530 U.S. at 147.
12 “Such an inference is consistent with the general principle of evidence law that the factfinder is
13 entitled to consider a party’s dishonesty about a material fact as ‘affirmative evidence of
14 guilt.’” *Id.*

15 While Defendant will likely maintain that there were further considerations at play (*see*
16 *Wernli Dec.*, at ¶ 3, claiming “at the time of this hiring process the design engineering group at
17 City Light was attempting to diminish the role of the ESEs, and we felt that hiring an ESE with
18 an engineering degree would enhance the ESEs’ stature”), Plaintiff is not required to show that
19 discrimination was the “sole” or even “principal reason” for her non-selection.²⁴ “But for”
20 causation is not required. *See* WPI 330.01.01.²⁵ Thus, it is not Plaintiff’s burden to “disprove
21 each of the [City]’s articulated reasons” for the non-selection. *Scrivener*, 181 Wn.2d at 447.

22 It is sufficient that the jury, considering all of the evidence in the light most favorable to
23 Ms. Gamble, may reasonably find that Plaintiff’s gender, age, and/or disability—statuses that all
24

25 ²⁴ *See Renz v. Spokane Eye Clinic, P.S.*, 114 Wn. App. 611, 621, 60 P.3d 106 (2002), *citing Wilmot v. Kaiser
Aluminum & Chem. Corp.*, 118 Wn. 2d 46, 70-72, 821 P.2d 18 (1991).

²⁵ *Wilmot*, 118 Wn.2d at 71.

1 contrasted with Mr. Rushwald—were a “substantial factor” in Plaintiff’s non-selection. Thus,
2 summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s claim for disparate treatment should be denied.

3 **C. Gamble raises an issue of fact as to whether she was subject to an abusive working**
4 **environment based on her gender and/or record or history of disability.**

5 To establish a prima facie hostile work environment claim, a plaintiff must show the
6 following four elements: ‘(1) the harassment was unwelcome, (2) the harassment was because
7 [plaintiff was a member of a protected class], (3) the harassment affected the terms and
8 conditions of employment, and (4) the harassment is imputable to the employer.’ Loeffelholz
9 v. Univ. of Washington, 175 Wn.2d 264, 285 P.3d 854 (2012). For claims of disability-based
10 harassment there is one additional element, that Plaintiff be “disabled within the meaning of
11 the antidiscrimination statute”;²⁶ however, that fact is undisputed here. In accordance with
12 RCW 49.60.040(7)(a), Plaintiff has a record or history of disability at City Light, as well as an
13 impairment that is “medically cognizable or diagnosable.” *See, e.g.*, Sheridan Dec., Ex. 5 at ¶
14 8, 10-12; Tort Claim, at 5 (Manville Dec., Ex. A, at Gamble Dep. Ex. 16, p. 5). Nor does
15 Defendant dispute that Plaintiff’s harassment was unwelcome, meaning that she “did not
16 solicit” the treatment and viewed it as “undesirable or offensive.”²⁷ Plaintiff repeatedly and
17 consistently objected to her mistreatment. *See, e.g.*, Sheridan Dec., Ex. 2; Ex. 24; Gamble Dec.,
18 Ex. 19 (EEO Complaint); Gamble Dec., Ex. 18 (2/26/12 email to investigator re: performance
19 review). Nor could the element of imputability be reasonably disputed, where as here Plaintiff
20 alleges that “manager[s] ... personally participate[d] in the harassment.” Robel, 148 Wn.2d at
21 47 (affirming employer liability where the assistant deli manager who made work assignment
22 for the deli participated in the harassment); *see also* Sheridan Dec., Ex. 6, at 69:11-70:6
23 (Enright admits she failed to report Gamble’s October 22nd report regarding Trout and his treat
24 of women to H.R., nor did she meet with Gamble after receiving the complaint).

25 ²⁶ Robel v. Roundup Corp., 148 Wn.2d 35, 45, 59 P.3d 611 (2002).

²⁷ *See Robel*, 148 Wn.2d at 45.

1 Thus, the only elements of the hostile work environment claim that are at issue are
2 whether the harassment (1) was “because of” Plaintiff’s protected status, *i.e.*, her disability
3 and/or gender; and (2) affected the terms and conditions of employment. The record here
4 presents issues of fact as to each of these elements.

5 **1. The Harassment Is Because of Plaintiff’s Disability**

6 [I]t is very difficult to prove what the state of a man’s mind at a particular time is...
7 Intent may be proved by circumstantial evidence. Indeed, in discrimination cases it will
8 seldom be otherwise....

8 deLisle v. FMC Corp., 57 Wn. App. 79, 83, 786 P.2d 839 (1990).

9 While circumstantial evidence would suffice, in this case Gamble presents evidence of
10 animus directly linked to her attendance record, which under Riehl is to be considered “part of
11 the disability.” *Accord* WPI 330.23 Comment (“Conduct or language ‘directly or proximately
12 related to’ a disability is ‘because of’ a disability. Robel v. Roundup Corp., 148 Wn.2d 35, 45,
13 59 P.3d 611 (2002).”) The same evidence of animus relevant to proving that Enright and
14 Wernli (Mr. Trout’s managers) denied Gamble promotions based on her disability is also
15 evidence showing that Gamble’s harassment was because of her attendance record and
16 disability. *See* Section IV.B.1., *supra*. Trout’s derogatory comments and unwarranted
17 criticisms were aimed directly at Ms. Gamble’s protected leave and thus her disability. *See*,
18 *e.g.*, Sheridan Dec., Ex. 4 (stating she had “a perpetual excuse for not coming in to work” and
19 “keeps sending in doctor’s notes that she needs to stay home.”); Sheridan Dec., Ex. 28
20 (tracking absences and referring to a “Dr. appt.” as an excuse); Sheridan Dec., Ex. 35
21 (criticizing Gamble for her “attendance records, over the past three years”). Thus, there should
22 be no dispute that Plaintiff has shown harassment by management was “because of” disability.

23 **2. The Harassment Is Because of Plaintiff’s Gender.**

24 A jury can also reasonably find from the evidence that Gamble’s harassment was
25 because of gender. As long as the conduct is “because of sex,” it need not be “sexual in nature”

1 or “involve sexual advances, innuendo, or physical conduct to be actionable.” Payne v.
2 Children's Home Soc., 77 Wn.App. 507, 512-13, 892 P.2d 1102 (1995). Trout’s negative
3 treatment of other women shows that his treatment of Gamble was because of gender. “[I]n the
4 civil employment context, evidence of employer treatment of other employees is not
5 impermissible character evidence; rather it may be admissible to show motive or intent for
6 ...discharge.” Brundridge v. Fluor Federal Servs., Inc., 164 Wn.2d 432, 444-46, 191 P.3d 879
7 (2008); *see also* Heyne v. Caruso, 69 F.3d 1475, 1479 (9th Cir. 1995) (“[A]n employer’s
8 conduct tending to demonstrate hostility towards a certain group is both relevant and
9 admissible where the employer’s general hostility towards that group is the true reason behind
10 firing an employee who is a member of that group.”); ER 404(b); *see also* Peone v. Mary
11 Walker School Dist. No. 207, 2003 WL 25685232 *1 (E.D.Wash.) (other bad acts may be
12 admissible on hostile work environment claim).

13 Here, there is evidence that Trout mistreated and harassed not only Ms. Gamble, but
14 other women, including his ex-wife, who obtained a restraining order against him, and Ms.
15 Gamble’s co-worker, Melissa Picken, who filed her own gender discrimination complaint. *See*
16 Sheridan Dec., Ex. 14, at 125:8-131:14; Sheridan Dec., Ex. 10, at 22:6-28:11; and Sheridan
17 Dec., Ex. 9 at 15. The investigator’s interview of Supervising ESR Allan Yamaguchi provides
18 additional evidence from which to find that the adverse treatment of Gamble was based on her
19 gender. Gamble Dec., Ex. 16 at 13527-0003 (“**[T]hinks there are some issues with women.**
20 ... [L]eaves Melissa out... It was insulting. Melissa was sitting right next to him.); *accord id.*
21 at 13527-0001 (“Treats Melissa differently? Yes. Whether conscious or not. He will talk to
22 Tief and Him, but not stop at Melissa’s office.”).

23 Also, to the extent the disparate treatment of Ms. Gamble in regards to promotion is
24 shown to be based on gender, such “discrete act” while not forming part of the hostile work
25 environment claim may still be cited as *evidence* used to create the inference that hostile acts

1 that are part of the harassment claim were because of gender. *See* Broyles v. Thurston Cty.,
2 147 Wn. App. 409, 434, 195 P.3d 985 (2008).

3 In its motion, Defendant mentions that as to Anne Albertson, Gamble “left her alone.”
4 *See* Def.’s Mot., at 9. However, such fact is a red herring and not determinative as to whether
5 Ms. Gamble or Ms. Picken were treated differently because of sex. *See, e.g., Connecticut v.*
6 Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 455, 102 S. Ct. 2525, 73 L. Ed. 2d 130 (1982) (“Congress never intended
7 to give an employer license to discriminate against some employees on the basis of ... sex
8 merely because he favorably treats other members of the employees’ group.”). “In other words,
9 discrimination against one employee cannot be remedied solely by nondiscrimination against
10 another employee in that same group.” Chadwick v. WellPoint, Inc., 561 F.3d 38, 42 (1st Cir.
11 2009).

12 On the record presented here, a jury can reasonably infer that Trout’s hostile acts
13 toward Ms. Gamble and Ms. Picken were because of gender.

14 3. The Harassment Affected The Terms and Conditions of Employment

15 “A satisfactory finding on [the third] element should indicate “[t]hat the conduct or
16 language complained of was so offensive or pervasive that it could reasonably be expected to
17 alter the conditions of plaintiff’s employment”” and “create an abusive working environment.”
18 Robel v. Roundup Corp., 148 Wn.2d 35, 46, 59 P.3d 611 (2002), quoting 6A WPI 330.23, at
19 240. Whether harassment is sufficiently severe or pervasive as to alter the conditions of
20 employment and create an abusive working environment is a “question of fact” determined
21 with regard to “the totality of the circumstances.” Adams v. Able Bldg. Supply, Inc., 114
22 Wn.App. 291, 296, 57 P.3d 280 (2002); Loeffelholz v. Univ. of Wash., 175 Wn.2d 264, 275,
23 285 P.3d 854 (2012).

24 “**Hostile work environment claims** ... occur[] over a series of days or perhaps
25 years.... Such claims **are based on the cumulative effect of individual acts.**” Antonius v.

1 King County, 153 Wn.2d 256, 264, 103 P.3d 729 (2004).²⁸ “The standard for linking
2 discriminatory acts together in the hostile work environment context is not high.” *Loeffelholz*,
3 175 Wn.2d. at 276. In determining whether conduct is sufficiently severe or pervasive, the
4 Court considers, *inter alia*, whether the conduct includes “public humiliation,” false
5 accusations of misconduct, and “whether the conduct interfered with the employee’s work
6 performance.” Adams, 114 Wn.App. at 297; Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1245-46 (9th
7 Cir. 2000). Notably, the Washington Supreme Court in Loeffelholz held that **a single**
8 **comment** a supervisor made to a group of employees, saying he was going to return from
9 military duty an “angry man,” “could be severe enough, *on its own*, to alter the conditions of
10 employment and establish a hostile work environment.” 175 Wn.2d at 277.

11 It is undisputed that Trout’s offensive conduct toward Gamble included public
12 humiliation. *See* Sheridan Dec., Ex. 3; Ex. 9 at 23 (“[I]t was inappropriate for him to mention
13 this issue to his subordinates and Ms. Gamble’s colleagues in a supervisor meeting.”). Gamble
14 answered in discovery, *inter alia*, that Trout “would always visit with the male supervisors, but
15 did not visit either” Melissa or I. *See* Answer to Interrogatory No. 16 (Manville Dec., Ex. C, at
16 35). Gamble testifies that “[w]hen I would make a suggestion about a business decision, Mr.
17 Trout would not discuss it with me and just tell me that he did not want to talk about it; the
18 decision had been made.” *Id.*

19 Other hostile acts forming the basis for the hostile work environment claim similarly
20 relate to conduct which unreasonably interfered with Plaintiff’s work performance. *See, e.g.*,
21 Sheridan Dec., Ex. 24 (“I have been pulled in at least 8 different directions and I get the feeling
22

23 _____
24 ²⁸ *Id.*, quoting *Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan*, 536 U.S. 101, 115, 122 S.Ct. 2061, 153 L.Ed.2d 106 (2002);
25 accord *Loeffelholz v. Univ. of Wash.*, 162 Wn. App. 360, 363, 253 P.3d 483 (2011) *aff’d in part*, 175 Wn.2d 264,
285 P.3d 854 (2012) (“A hostile work environment claim is composed of a series of separate acts that collectively
constitute one unlawful employment practice. A plaintiff is entitled to present evidence of harassment ... to show
the cumulative effect of the acts, provided some of the objectionable conduct occurred within the limitations
period.”)

1 he is setting me up for failure. Whenever I think we have an understanding on something, he
2 changes the game plan”); *accord* Answer to Interrogatory No. 1 (Manville Dec., Ex. C, at 8)
3 and Gamble Dec., Ex. 16 at 13527-0001 – 0002. (“[T]hey set [her] up to fail. They kept
4 changing her direction as training coordinator, her level of responsibility, the product having to
5 develop, and then put into role of being service rep in a district. ESR role to deal with
6 customers and then was still responsible for training piece as well – although they understand
7 that had ESR role as well. They asked her several times to produce this, but she could not
8 because she was busy. ... Purposefully adding a lot of stuff on her plate.”) The denial of
9 telecommuting on tangible projects with deliverables, which Trout admits he let others do, but
10 denied Gamble when she asked for the opportunity to “complete a project without
11 interruptions, such as researching to develop training programs, **re-writing the RESC**
12 **manual**, up-dating CESIP documents” likewise interfered with her work performance.
13 *Compare* Ex. 26-27; *with* Trout Dec., ¶ 11 (recognizing that he permitted others to “revis[e]
14 the Residential Electrical Service Code [**RESC**]” by telecommuting)

15 Ms. Gamble became “sick to [her] stomach, just having to defend [her]self every step
16 of the way with” Trout. Manville Dec., Ex. A at Gamble Dep. Ex. 34. She suffers “depression
17 as the result of [her] discrimination and hostile work environment and [is] prescrib[ed] drugs to
18 help [her] condition.” Answer to Interrogatory No. 11 (Manville Dec., Ex. C, at 29); Tort
19 Claim at 6 (Manville Dec., Ex. A, at Gamble Dep. Ex. 16, p. 6 (Appx. D)) (“I have suffered
20 severe emotional distress. I felt bullied and harassed. I have felt like a speck of dirt....”). In
21 Davis v. W. One Auto. Grp., 140 Wn. App. 449, 458, 166 P.3d 807 (2007) the Court of
22 Appeals in evaluating whether harassment was “sufficiently pervasive as to alter the conditions
23 of employment and create an abusive working environment” noted that Plaintiff had similarly
24 reported that he was “[p]robably mentally sick, drained,” and that “[a]n inference could be
25 drawn that this was the result of the hostile work environment.” *Id.*

1 Here, Gamble testifies in her discovery answers that Trout’s treatment of her
2 “discouraged [her] from using [her] FML, vacation and other leaves that were available to [her]
3 by listing [her] time off for the past three years on [her] performance evaluation.” Answer to
4 Interrogatory No. 1 (Manville Dec., Ex. C, at 8). Such result was anticipated. *See* Sheridan
5 Dec., Ex. 4 at ¶ 2. The adverse performance evaluation, issued to Gamble with upper
6 management’s review and approval, falsely accused Gamble of misconduct based on her
7 attendance record where “a good portion of her absences were coded as either L&I Leave or
8 unpaid FML,” Sheridan Dec., Ex. 9 at 12, violating the exact letter of Seattle City Light’s
9 policies, and infringing upon Gamble’s rights to use authorized sick leave. *See* Sheridan Dec.,
10 Ex. 25. (Policy: “Supervisors must not reference an employee’s FML absences in any
11 discussions regarding absenteeism, productivity, performance, etc. The supervisor must not use
12 the taking of FML as a basis for any adverse personnel action, nor as a reason to deny a benefit
13 or working condition for which the employee would otherwise be eligible.”). The fact that
14 Gamble was able to use the labor union’s grievance process to subsequently have the
15 evaluation revoked from one of her personnel files does not make Trout and his managers
16 issuance of the improper evaluation any less of a hostile act.

17 These hostile acts, among many others, created a working environment that is any less
18 abusive than the working environment that the Court in Loeffelholz held “could be severe
19 enough,” based on *a single comment “on its own*, to alter the conditions of employment and
20 establish a hostile work environment.” 175 Wn.2d at 277. The motion should therefore be
21 denied as to Plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim.

22 **D. Gamble raises an issue of fact as to whether she was subjected to retaliation.**

23 Plaintiff repeatedly engaged in protected activity, of which her management had notice.
24 In May 2012 Gamble wrote to H.R. opposing her discriminatory non-selection for OOC ESE—
25 opposition that both Wernli and Enright were immediately made aware of by H.R. *See* Ex. 22.

1 After this, Trout is hired by Enright and Wernli as Gamble’s new manager on August 29 and
2 by September 4th, he is tracking her attendance including instances, such as one on September 4
3 where Gamble reports visiting her doctor and on September 13, becoming ill from medications.
4 *See* Ex. 28.

5 In October, Gamble engaged in further protected activity when she opposed
6 discriminatory treatment related to her disability and gender, sending emails opposing Trout’s
7 treatment to Trout, as well as to H.R., to the H.R. Director (DaVonna Johnson), and to the
8 Customer Care Director two levels above Trout (Ms. Enright). *See* Ex. 1 (“[Y]ou should
9 become familiar with our Sick Leave Policy before making these accusations. I am under the
10 care of my I am under the care of my physician for my illness and I will be contacting our HR
11 Department regarding your treatment and accusations.”); and Ex. 22 (“Do they just not like
12 women?”).

13 When Trout was asked if Director Enright had shared with him the concerns Gamble
14 presented in her October 22 email, in which she had claimed he was treating her and Melissa
15 Picken differently, he answered that he “did not recall”. Sheridan Dec., Ex. 10 at 64:7-66:23.
16 The jury can reasonably infer that Enright did in fact make Trout aware of the October 22nd
17 email claiming that Trout and Wernli do not like women.

18 In mid-December Trout assigned Gamble, who is a Supervising ESR, to do the work of
19 Senior ESR at a different location (the North Service Center). The change effectively put her
20 “in a lower position, and there were other people that probably could have done that, but yet
21 [she] was sent there. So in [her] mind [she] felt like I was being punished.” Sheridan Dec., Ex.
22 30 at 256:6-258:2. “NSC was a very busy location. Mr. Trout expected [Gamble] to do three
23 different jobs, and still expected [her] to work on [her] training modules. Mr. Trout expected
24 me to work as an ESR in the field, continue training and provide great customer service.” *See*
25 Gamble Dec., ¶ 42.

1 Around this same time, beginning in December 2012 and continuing through February
2 15, 2013, Gamble made formal complaints to H.R. and to Director about her treatment by both
3 Wernli and Trout. *See, e.g.*, Gamble Dec., ¶ 38-39, 50; Gamble Dec., Ex. 11.

4 On February 26, 2013, Gamble received the adverse evaluation that made inaccurate
5 assertions, factual misstatements and accusations of poor performance. *See* Gamble Dec., ¶
6 52. It appeared to Gamble that the evaluation, which Mr. Trout testified was reviewed and
7 approved by David Wernli and Director Enright, was “designed to degrade” her and “to
8 diminish [her] professional integrity and reputation.” *Id.*

9 Gamble’s de facto demotion and reassignment to the NSC and the adverse performance
10 evaluation, which violated City Light’s policy on protected leave, among many other acts,
11 create an issue of fact as to whether Gamble was subject to unlawful retaliation.

12 “[P]roof of the employer’s motivation must be shown by circumstantial evidence
13 because the employer is not apt to announce retaliation as his motive.” Kahn v. Salerno, 90
14 Wn. App. 110, 130, 951 P.2d 321, 332 (1998). Here, there is strong circumstantial evidence of
15 retaliation from which the jury can infer retaliation, where Trout wrote to Gamble that her
16 “habit of making derogatory comments about other people behind their backs” and “negative
17 remarks find their way back to their target and serve to create an environment of mistrust and
18 disrespect.” *See* Gamble Dec., Ex. 13 at CITYLIGHT015329. Moreover, the proximity in time
19 between Gamble’s protected activities and her de facto demotion and adverse performance
20 review is another factor suggesting a retaliatory motivation. *See* Estevez, 129 Wn. App. at
21 799. The deviation from established policies and procedures, criticizing Gamble for using
22 protected leave in derivation of the leave policy is also evidence of a discriminatory motive.
23 *See, e.g.*, Lyons v. England, 307 F.3d 1092, 1101-02, 1115-16 (9th Cir.2002); Diaz v. Eagle
24 Produce Ltd. Partnership, 521 F.3d 1201 (9th Cir. 2008); Nicholson v. Hyannis Air Service,
25 Inc., 580 F.3d 1116, 1127 (9th Cir. 2009). And, where, as here, “the employee establishes that

1 he or she participated in an opposition activity, the employer knew of the opposition activity,
2 and he or she was discharged [or had other adverse action taken against him], then a rebuttable
3 **presumption is created in favor of the employee that precludes us from dismissing the**
4 **employee's case.**" Kahn v. Salerno, 90 Wn. App. 110, 131, 951 P.2d 321, 332 (1998).

5 While Defendant's managers aver they did not take into consideration any of Plaintiff's
6 protected statuses, including her prior activities, on summary judgment, the Court is to
7 "disregard all [such] evidence favorable to the moving party that the jury is not required to
8 believe,"²⁹ and "the cause [should] proceed to trial in order that the opponent may be allowed
9 to disprove [the] facts [averred in affidavits] by cross-examination and by the demeanor of the
10 moving party while testifying." See Felsman v. Kessler, 2 Wn. App. 493, 496-97, 468 P.2d
11 691, 693 (1970).

12 Defendant does not dispute Plaintiff engaged in protected activity, but instead presents
13 as an issue whether Plaintiff can show that "she suffered an adverse employment action." See
14 Def.'s Mot. at 14. The acts alleged here are adequate to state a claims for retaliation. In October
15 2012, in response to an inquiry about filing a complaint against Jon Trout, Employee Relations
16 Coordinator Stefani Coverson wrote Gamble, in relevant part,

17 Under the law and SCL policy, you have the right to not be retaliated against for filing
18 a complaint.... A person suffers retaliation when an adverse employment action (e.g.,
19 discipline, alienation, humiliation, or **any act that would dissuade a reasonable**
20 **person from engaging in the protected activity**) is taken against him/her because s/he
has participated in an investigation, filed a complaint, or requested an accommodation.

21 Gamble Dec., Ex. 5.

22 The information Defendant gave to Gamble then is an accurate statement of the law.
23 Under the WLAD's prohibition on retaliation, RCW 49.60.210, Plaintiffs may recover
24 damages for "**any materially adverse [act], meaning that it would have " 'dissuaded a**
25

²⁹ Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 151, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000).

1 reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination” and “
2 ‘whether a particular action would be viewed as adverse by a reasonable employee is a
3 question of fact appropriate for a jury.’ Boyd v. State, Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 187
4 Wn. App. 1, 13-14, 349 P.3d 864, 870 (2015); *see also* Burchfiel v. Boeing Corp., 149 Wn.
5 App. 468, 483, 205 P.3d 145, 152 (2009) (“Burchfiel showed other adverse employment
6 action. ... Ms. Thomas ordered a corrective action memo against him and put it in his
7 personnel file.”)

8 Mr. Trout’s public humiliation of Gamble, telling other supervisors that she has a
9 “perpetual excuse for not,” his denial of benefits afforded to other employees (e.g.,
10 telecommuting on tangible projects), his reassignment of her and de facto demotion, and the
11 papering of Gamble’s file with untrue accusations that were approved by Trout, Wernli and
12 Enright all present an issue of fact as to whether Gamble was treated in a “materially adverse”
13 manner, such that she might be “dissuaded from making ... a charge of discrimination.

14 **V. CONCLUSION**

15 Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court deny the motion for summary judgment.

16
17 DATED this 27th day of June, 2016.

18
19 THE SHERIDAN LAW FIRM, P.S.

20
21 By: s/John P. Sheridan
22 John P. Sheridan, WSBA # 21473
23 *Attorneys for Plaintiff*

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Melanie Kent, certify under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of Washington, that on June 27, 2016, I electronically filed the foregoing document with the Clerk of the Court using the ECR E-Filing system, and served the following persons using the ECR E-Serve system:

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